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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
DISCONNECTION OF 
TERRITORY FRO~I LAYTON 
CITY, A MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
I Case No. 
\ 
12456 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT 
Respondent agrees with appellant's statement of 
the nature of the case and the disposition of the matter 
in the lower court. Respondent does not agree with ap-
pellant's statement of facts except that, as in appellant's 
Brief, reference in this Brief to petitioner refers to Rob-
ert D. Sawyer since he was the principal agent and man-
ager for the partnership owner of the tract in question. 
Hespondent also agrees that in March, 1968, peti-
tioner filed this action in the District Court to disconnect 
approximately 80 acres from Layton City, and that upon 
1 
hearing of the action before Honorable John F. Wahl. 
quist, the District Court entered an order disconnecting 
the 80-acre tract in question. As in appellant's Brief, 
reference to the material facts of record is made in the 
points of the argument below and will not be duplicated 
here. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FACTS SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECISION AND THE APPELLANT CANNOT 
SHOW THAT THE DECISION \VAS CLEAR. 
LY AND PATENTLY ERRONEOUS. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 10-4-2 ( 1953) pro· 
vides: 
If the court finds that the petition was signed 
by a majority of the real property owners of the 
territory concerned and that the allegations of 
the petition are true and that justice and equity 
require that such territory or any. part there~! 
should be disconnected from such city or town, it 
shall appoint three disinterested persons as com· 
missioners to adjust the terms upon which such 
part shall be so seyered as to any li~bilities of such 
city or town that have accrued durn~g the connec· 
tion of such part with the corporation, and as to 
the mutual property rights of the city or to~ 
and the territory to be detached. [Emphas1~ 
added.) 
In its earlier rulings regarding disconnection under 
this statute, this Court has made it very clear that the de· 
2 
termination of whether "justice and equity" require dis-
connection is not to be made by the trial court rotely 
deciding whether or not the case falls into one of the 
"categories" of past cases, but rather by assessing all the 
facts of the instant case to determine in which direction 
the scales of justice tip. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. City 
of Bingham Canyon, 18 Utah 2d 60, 415 P.2d 209, 211 
(1966); In re Chief Consolidated Mining Co., 71 Utah 
4<30, 266 P. 1044, 1046 ( 1928). No one would question 
appellant's contention that this gives the trier of fact 
wide discretion, but our judicial system has long placed 
the primary responsibility for resolving issues which re-
quire a balancing of all the facts upon the trier of fact 
who sees the evidence presented at trial. 
In the instant case a hearing was held wherein the 
parties which could be benefited or damaged by the 
subject disconnection presented evidence to support 
their respective positions. The trial court weighed all the 
eyidence and concluded that the advantages of discon-
nection to all concerned clearly outweighed the disad-
vantages, and that therefore, justice and equity would 
best be served by granting the landowner's request. This 
Court has ruled in previous disconnection cases that the 
appellate court must defer to the trial court's conclu-
sion unless it is clearl.IJ and patently erroneous. In other 
words, the granting of disconnection is a f a.ctual deter-
mination and unless the facts were so one-sided as to 
permit only one conclusion, the trial court's finding 
should Le affirmed. On this point, this court in In re 
Chief Consolidated ft,finin.r; Company, et al., supra. 
stated: 3 
"The facts in each case, under well recognized 
principles of law, must, to a very large extent 
determine that question. ' 
"The detennination of the facts upon which 
resolution of the is:sues is predicated is primarily 
for the trial court. The loss of sales and use tax~s 
is not in and of itself sufficient to justify denial of 
the petition for disconneetion. In this instance the 
court concluded that whatever benefits would re-
sult from the denial of the petition were out-
weighed by the advantages to be gained by grant-
ing it, which justified the judgment it rendered 
in favor of the plaintiff. Under traditional rule.s 
of review that judgment must not be disturbed 
inasmuch as it is not made to appear that it was 
clearly and patently erroneous." [Emphasis add-
ed.] 
The appellant, by the assertions it makes in its Brief 
regarding the present status of the land in question and 
the municipal services presently available to it from the 
City of Layton, has completely disregarded a number of 
important facts to which the parties stipulated prior to 
the commencement of trial, including the following: 
l. That there presently are no roads (except for an 
unimproved county road on the easterly boundary), im· 
provements or buildings upon the land involved in this 
action (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the sub· 
j ect territory") ; 
2. That Layton City pr<>Yides no water, garbage 
service or sewer service to the ~uhject territory; 
4 
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3. That the nearest Layton City water line runs 
approximately 400 feet from the border of the subject 
property; 
4. That the East Layton Township is presently pro-
Yiding sewer and water service to the subject territory. 
(Pretrial Order R. 23-27.) 
The conclusion of the trial court that disconnection 
should be allowed in this case is amply supported by the 
facts established of record. The subject territory is lo-
cated approximately three miles, as the crow flies, from 
the downtown Layton City area ( T. 29); it is approxi-
mately 11/~ miles between the subject territory and any 
existing tract development in Layton (T. 30). At all 
times pertinent, the subject territory has been used 
strictly as farming land, on which petitioner raised a 
little wheat and oats (T. 36). The land is still essentially 
agricultural land on which there are no roads and no 
water or sewer lines extending to the property from 
Layton; the nearest Layton sewer line is at least a mile 
away (T. 35-36). The Layton City Attorney candidly 
admitted that the subject territory is, in fact, unde-
veloped, and that it contains no inhabitants (T. 12). 
The subject territory ·was not within the limits of 
Layton City when the city was incorporated, but was 
subsequently annexed by Layton; the property owner's 
consent to the annexation was not sought or obtained and 
Layton City almost by happenstance annexed only half 
the property owner's parcel, putting the city line right 
down the middle of that parcel (T. 17). 
5 
Petitioner testified that for any feasible develop. 
ment of the property, the land must have available sewer 
~nd water service and roads and other services coming 
mto the community in a convenient manner; it must have 
power, telephones, gas, garbage collection, snow re-
moval, police protection and fire protection ( T. i3-24). 
The petitioner had preliminary discussions with Layton 
City officials as early as 1960 with respect to the pros· 
pects of obtaining city sewer and water services for the 
subject territory (T. 18-19). During these early discus-
sions, petitioner was informed that Layton City had a 
1960 l\Iaster Plan which called for roads and improve-
ments and also the provision of water and sewer service 
to the subject territory. Some fiYe years thereafter, and 
in reliance upon Layton City's Master Plan for such 
roads, improvements and services, the petitioner pur· 
chased the subject territory ('I'. 20). 
After the petitioner acquired the subject property, 
he again contacted Layton City officials with respect to 
the possible development of the parcel and the available 
services to that area. In 1967, he conferred with Byron 
.McGregor, Layton City Engineer, and was told that he 
could not commence development of the area, i.e., that 
there were no sewer or water services available at that 
time. McGregor indicated Layton had "nothing in the 
immediate area or plans at the time" (T. 30-31). Peti· 
tioner, at the time of this 19()7 meeting with McGregor, 
made notes on a drawing of the parcel, and those note! 
show that McGregor informed petitioner that the onl)· 
possibility of getting water to the parcel was by the re· 
6 
P· activation of an old water main coming from a reservoir 
er a considerable distance from the parcel; that Layton 
ig could only, even with such reactivation of the old line, 
ve bring water to the northwest corner of the parcel (Ex-
e- hibit E); an<l that Layton had "no intention of running 
). a sewer line" into the subject territory at that time (T. 
)Il 33-34). 
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At the time Call Engineering Company was de-
veloping plans for water and sewer service to the subject 
territory, representatiYcs of Call were also advised that 
there was no service available to that area from the City 
of Layton ( T. 91-92). Call Engineering went ahead and 
developed feasible service plans, and petitioner and the 
Town of East Layton implemented them. As a result, 
the subject territory presently has adequate water avail-
able to it from a 10-inch main which runs parallel to 
Cherry Lane in the East Layton portion of the parcel; 
it was designed and has the capacity to handle any resi-
dential development of the area ( T. 27-28). The terri-
tory is also presently being served by a natural drainage 
sewer system having the capacity to service all of the 
subject territory and the entire foothill area to the east 
(T. 26-29, 92-9.J.). Expert testimony was heard to the 
effect that any sewer system now proposed by Layton 
would be duplicitous and that the water system proposed 
by Layton, utili:ting standby power and pump stations, 
would not only be unnecessary, but undesirable from an 
engineering standpoint ('I'. ;38-4<0, 8G-87, 102). 
The petitionn testified that it would be difficult, if 
7 
not impossible, to develop a projeet which straddled a 
line between two cities or towns ( T. 40-44). It was his 
judgment that dealing with two taxing bodies would 
create a "complicated situation" and if one sewer or 
water system was used to serve both sides of the line, the 
non-residents of the city providing the service would 
likely be charged substantially greater rates than the 
residents. He further pointed out that building restric· 
tions, zoning ordinances, etc. would be different and all 
plans and specifications would have to be approved by 
both townships im·olved (T. 43-44). Expert testimony 
also established that development of the parcel in two 
separate cities would create substantial engineering prob· 
lems (T. 95-97, 110). The engineer for East Layton 
testified "it would be folly" to try to supply necessary 
services to the development from a city on each side (1'. 
115). He testified further that duplicative facilities 
would be extremely costly (T. 115-116). 
East Layton officials testified that if disconnection 
were disallowed, East Layton would charge the Layton 
residents of the project utility service fees "double the 
standard fee for any resident ... simply because they 
pay no tax base to it" (T. 119-120). Those same officials 
also testified that East Layton presently offers all con· 
ventional municipal services to that portion of the sub· 
ject territory lying withiu the boundary of East Layton, 
i.e., sewer, water, fire, police, etc. (T. 120-121); and that 
East Layton cont>trncted the existing sewer and water 
lines with the in'ent of sening the entire parcel involved 
here (T. 122). 
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None of the subject territory has to date been 
platted. The only recorded plat is on 11 lots in the south-
ern half of the whole parcel, which part was in East 
Layton c\·en before the disconnection (T. 18). 
The development proposed for the subject territory 
is "planned unit development" where the residential areas 
are clustered together and large common areas are left 
available for parks, drives and recreation areas (T. 20-
21). Petitioner testified that it is particularly important, 
in carrying out planned unit development, that an area 
be developed as one parcel, since common walls, yards 
and other common areas cannot be divided by a city line 
( T. 21-22). East Layton has approved zoning ordinances 
allowing for the planned unit development contemplated 
by petitioner, whereas Layton City's present ordinances 
would not permit such development (T. 40 and Stipu-
lated Fact, Pretrial Order p. 25). 
At the trial below, Layton City officials attempted 
to justify their previous unwillingness to supply needed 
senices to the subject territory by testifying that the 
services sought by petitioner "would be available" to that 
property if and when it was developed ('l'. 147-149). 
Such testimony is completely self-serving and rather in-
credible in light of the fact that Layton was aware from 
at least 1967 that petitioner desired to go ahead with de-
velopment as soon as the necessary services were avail-
able, and Layton still did absolutely nothing. Such testi-
mony is also in eurious conflict with the evidence ad-
dueed below that there are residents of Layton residing 
9 
in an area east of the subject territory to whom Layton 
even now ref uses to of fer any sewer and water service 
(T. 137-138). 
The trial record indicates that the City of Layton 
obviously does not rely on this land becoming valuable 
residential property in the near future, i.e., it has no 
water or sewer plans, nor has it incurred any bonding or 
other obligations relating to such potential use. Since the 
subject territory is located on the outermost boundary 
of Layton City, and there is no chance of the city ex-
panding all around the property, thus making it an 
"island," the fact of potential residential use is irrelevant, 
and only its existing nature is important here. 
To date, petitioner has invested over $400,000.00 in 
his project and Layton City has contributed nothing to 
that development ( T. 45). The tax loss to Layton City 
from disconnection is minimal, as petitioner pays under 
$500 a year property tax on the 80 acres, and the land 
is not a source of revenue to Layton City except for those 
taxes ( T. 36-37) . 
Petitioner testified that Layton has done nothing to 
implement its 1960 Master Plan with respect to the sub-
ject territory (T. 37); that the only roads into the area 
have been developed by the petitioner and not by Layton 
City ( T. 164) ; and that in his judgment, Layton rend-
ers no significant municipal services to the subject ter· 
ritory and confers no benefits upon it (T. 37). 
Petitioner testified that, all things considered, he 
preferred to have the subject territory disconnected from 
10 
Layton City and developed as part of the East Layton 
Township ( T. 46). Appellant, in its Brief (p. 13) makes 
the statement that "there is not a single precedent either 
in Utah law or any case from any other state known to 
the city's counsel or submitted to the court by petitioner's 
counsel" supporting the trial court's consideration of the 
owner's preference as a key factor. However, one of the 
very cases cited by appellant, Creery v. Town of Oko-
boji, 253 N."\V. 810 (Iowa 1934) clearly establishes that 
this is one of the four factors to be weighed by the court 
(albeit to a lesser extent than the others) . Any claimed 
paucity of authority on this point undoubedly arises from 
the simple premise that a landowner's preference for dis-
connection from one city and/ or annexation to another 
city can be assumed from the mere fact of his petition. 
Hespondent submits that where, as here, each of 
two towns claims to be able to serve the subject territory, 
and no real damage will result to the town from which 
the property is severed, and there is no sound reason for 
preserving the boundary line status quo, the landowner's 
expressed preference to be in one town and not the other 
should be accorded considerable weight. 
POINT II 
AX ACTION FOR DISCON~ECTION OFTER-
HITOHY FHOM A CITY IS NOT DETER-
J\IIN.ED BY ATTE~IPTING TO FIT THE AP-
PLICATION "'ITHIN ONE OR T'VO LIMIT-
11 
ED CATEGORIES, llUT RATHER llY THE 
COURT'S APPRAISAL OF \\THAT IS THE 
MOST JUST AND EQUITABLE RESULT IN 
LIGHT OF ALL Tl-IE FACTS IN EVIDENCE. 
'Vhile appellant correctly states in its Brief that 
the standard of "justice and equity" expressed in Sec-
tion 10-4-2 U.C.A. ( 1953) is given form and content by 
past decisions of this court, appellant incorrectly attempts 
to limit the application of that standard to the static 
factual situations presented in those prior cases. 
Past decisions are obviously instructive, for similar 
facts in cases with similar results tend to rebut any claim 
of clear and patent error. However, appellant's charac-
terization of Utah cases granting disconnection as all 
falling within one or two categories is a gross over-sim-
plification. These decisions were all made on a case-by-
case evaluation of all the facts presented, and while cer· 
tain facts may be present in more than one case, such 
facts cannot be viewed as a determinative legal standard. 
Rather than try to "categorize" these cases as all involv-
ing or not involving certain facts, one should examine 
them to see what kinds of facts are properly considered 
in determining the justice and equity issue in a discon· 
nection proceeding. 
In Young v. Salt Lake Cit;tJ, 24 Utah 321, 67 Pac. 
1066 (1902), the court found that justice and equity 
warranted disconnection where the facts showed the land 
to be unplatted, five miles from the business section of 
the city, unable to receive any municipal benefits, and 
12 
"unfit for municipal or residential purposes." It is in-
teresting to note that the land at that time deemed "un-
fit" for residential use is situated in the foothills just 
north of Emigration Canyon in Salt Lake County, an 
area which undoubtedly would warrant a different con-
clusion today as to its fitness for such use. 
The potential of land to become residential property 
when at the time of the disconnection proceedings it has 
not been so used, is only relevant if ( 1) it is apparent 
that disconnection of the land will create a hiatus or 
island within the city, making service to the surrounding 
area more difficult, or ( 2) foe city has somehow relied 
to its detriment on the property being so used in the near 
future. Certainly, if the residential area of the city is 
likely to expand all around the proposed disconnected 
property, making sewer and water systems, police and 
fire services, etc. more difficult, the potential residential 
use is important. In the instant case, however, the subject 
territory is on the outermost boundary of Layton City 
and there is no chance of the city expanding all around 
the property. Layton City simply does not have the risk 
of someday being forced to service around an "island" if 
this land is allO"wed to be severed. Furthermore, the rec-
ord demonstrates that Layton City has only minimal 
financial obligations, and none of these were specifically 
incurred in reliance upm the future residential potential 
of the subject territory. (See R. 38 and 43). 
The absence in tlie instant case of any sound or ac-
cepted reason for maintaining the boundary line in its 
13 
status quo, makes it apparent that the appellant's strenu-
ous argument to deny disconnection because of the po-
tential residential use of this land is centered on appel-
lant's desire to receive future tax revenues from the sub-
ject territory. This has been ruled by this court to be an 
invalid reason for denying disconnection. Kennecott 
Copper Corp. v. Cty of Bingham, 18 Utah 2<l 60, 415 
P.2d 204 ( 1966); and Application of Peterson, 92 Utah 
212, 66 P.2d 1195 ( 1937). \Vhere, as here, the city has 
not serviced the subject territory, nor obligated itself to 
do so, and disconnection will not make service to the rest 
of the city more expensive, the additional revenues are 
unnecessary because the area serviced is not increased. 
This court granted severance in the next three cases 
following Young. In re Fullmer, 33 Utah 43, 92 Pac. 
768 ( 1907); Christensen v. 'Town of Clearfield, 66 Utah 
-155, 243 Pac. 376 ( 1926); and In re Town of Smithfield, 
70 Utah 564, 262 Pac. 105 ( 1927). In Fullmer and 
Smithfield, the appellants' arguments that the evidence 
did not support the fin dings received only slight consid· 
eration. In both cases, the trial court's decision to dis· 
connect \Vas summarily affirmed because the evidence 
was found to be ample to support a finding that the land 
did not receiYe any direct or appreciable benefit from 
being within the city. In Christensen, the court was more 
explicit in spelling out such a lack of benefits or services, 
stating that, just as here, the land was agricultural, one 
to two miles from the business section, not platted for 
any municipal purpose, not within the city water servi~es 
and without city sidewalks, curbs, gutters, fire and pohce 
service. 14 
One of the reasons Layton seeks to retain the sub-
ject territory is a fear that this case may start a trend 
along Layton's eastern border of landowners seeking to 
disconnect from Layton and be annexed by East Lay-
ton. In Application uf Peterson, 92 Utah 212, 66 P.2d 
1195 ( rnH7), this court rejected such a "domino theory," 
stating: 
"That the owners of other agricultural lands 
may seek to have their lands withdrawn from the 
corporate limits is a question which can be met in 
the proper way when that question arises, if it 
eyer does." 66 P.2d at 1197. 
In the Peterson case, the land was located on the 
western boundary of the town, was agricultural in char-
acter, had neYer been used for any other purpose than 
to raise hay and other farm products, and it had no 
buildings upon it except a small shack. Furthermore, 
although the town had a sewer system, it was located at 
too high an elevation to serve any portion of the severed 
lands. City water was available to the land but could be 
more conyeniently provided from a privately owned sys-
tem. The nearest water fire hydrant maintained by the 
town was about a mile distant. The land was about a mile 
from the business section of town. There was no paving 
or sidewalks or other improvements abutting or near the 
land. The case was unique in that the city had financially 
obligated itself for sewer and water systems while the 
land was within the l'ity. The court still allowed discon-
nection since the obligations were incurred after the ap-
plication and as indicated, it was not feasible to use the 
l5 
city's systems to serve the land. The court also noted that 
no island or hiatus would occur from granting severance 
and that the city's loss of potential tax revenue was not a 
proper ground for denial. 
The facts as found in Peterson are almost identical 
to those in the instant case, and the facts that differ sup. 
port disconnection. The court's reasoning in that case 
should be highly persuasive on this appeal. 
The most recent Utah cases in point are Howard v. 
Town of North Salt Lake, 7 Utah 2d 278, 323 P.2d 261 
( 1958) and Kennecott Copper Corp. v. City of Bing· 
ham, 18 Utah 2d 60, 415 P.2d 209 ( 1966). In both these 
cases the court granted severance. In Howard, the court 
found that the town water system did not extend into 
the disconnected area. The water system of Layton City 
does not extend into the subject territory in the instant 
case (Stipulated Fact, R. 25). The court also found in 
the Haward case that the only structures which were 
upon the disonnected territory consisted of the building~ 
and facilities of the owners of the land. The court found 
that there were no sidewalks, curbs or gutters within the 
involved area. There are no sidewalks, curbs or gutters 
within the involved area in the instant case (Stipulated 
Fact, R. 25). The court further found that two principal 
roads traversed the area. There are no roads upon the 
subject territory in the instant case (Stipulated Fact, R. 
25). The court in the II award case found that there wn~ 
no evidence that the police of ~ orth Salt Lake did an)' 
patrolling in the involved area. Furthermore, the court 
16 
found that no garbage removal was conducted by the 
town in the disconnected area. These facts are the same 
in the instant case (Stipulated Fact, R. 25 and T. 44 and 
12..J.). It is significant that the same judge who tried the 
instant case, Hon. John F. 'Vahlquist, was also the trial 
judge in the Howard case. 
In the Kennecott case, the City of Bingham's ordi-
nances were making expansion of mining operations dif-
ficult and Kennecott Copper applied to have the land 
severed from the city. The severed property was 90 per 
cent of the city's area, yet the court still found justice 
and equity supported the de~ire of the landowner since 
at the time of the application there were no inhabitants 
in the severed area, and thus, no city benefits running to 
the property. 
This court has established in the foregoing cases the 
clear proposition that when land is distant from the busi-
ness center of a community, has no improvements upon 
it, receiYes no water from the town, has no dwellings 
thereon, has no inhabitants, receives very few services 
from the community, is not particularly necessary for the 
present or future needs of the community, and there is 
no interdependent relationship between the property in 
question and the community, then disconnection of the 
property should be allowed. 
Out of all the Utah decisions on the issue of sever-
ance, only in one instance has the landowner's request 
been denied. In re Chief Comolidated Mininy Co., 71 
Utah 430, 2fHi Pac. 104-t. ( 1928), involved an applica-
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tion by the operator of a mine to have some of its land 
disconnected from the city limits of .Mammoth City. 
\-Vhile the request was granted for the lands that did not 
contain any mines, it was denied as to severance of the 
mining lands. This decision is not based on the nature of 
the lands being non-agricultural, as appellant implies in 
its Brief, but rather on the fact that the city and the mine 
were so integrated with and interdependent upon one 
another that severance would have been extremely un-
just. The mine was the only reason the town existed. 
Virtually every resident of the city worked for the owner 
of the mining property and the court refused, quite prop-
erly, to let the employer free itself from supporting a 
city it created and relied on. It is clear that the facts in 
the instant case are completely different from those 
present in the C onsolidatcd ~lining case. In this case, as 
the trial court found, there is a complete absence of any 
significant interdependence between the subject territory 
and the City of Layton. For that reason, the Consoli-
dated ~fining case is of no aid to the appellant here. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT'S AC T H 0 RI T I E S FROM 
OTHER JURISDICTIONS ARE INAPPOSITE 
TO THE INSTANT CASE. 
The cases appellant cites to the court from other 
jurisdictions are inapposite and of no authoritative value 
here. The two Iowa cases [Iowa P ~ L Co. v. Incorpo· 
rated 1-'own of Pleasant Hill, 112 N."T· 2d 304 (Iowa 
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1962), and Creery v. Town of Okoboji, 253 N.W. 810 
(Iowa 1934) ] cited by appellant are totally unreliable as 
authority because the Iowa statute is crucially different 
from Utah's. Under Iowa law. a petition for severance 
must be denied if the city "is capable of extending into 
such territory substantial municipal services." Iowa p 
~ L Co. v. Incorporated Town of Pleasant Hill, supra. 
In Utah, while capability of service is a factor to be con-
sidered in the balance, it by no means is determinative. In 
addition, the Creery case involved a potential hiatus and 
unlike here, there was no adjacent city the petitioner 
was seeking severance to join. Thus, the owner's desire 
would have resulted in a strip of county land, bisecting 
the city. This is hardly analogous to changing the bound-
ary line between two cities. 
Shelton Grain and Supply Co. v. Village of Shelton, 
134 N.,V. 2d 815 (Neb. 1965), also concerned a land-
owner who was seeking to disconnect his land from towns 
altogether, not deannexation from one to join another, 
and thus this case offers no unique insight on the instant 
one. This case is further distinguishable because Ne-
braska law provides a trial de nova in its Supreme 
Court for seyerance cases. Therefore, this case does not 
mean petitioner's grounds for severance were rejected as 
much as it means they were not proved in accordance 
with X ebraska' s statutes. 
"Thile appellant's statement of Brooks v. City of 
South Siou.r Ji'alh, 73 N.,V. 2d 339 (S.D. 1955) is cor-
reet as far as it goes, two distinguishing facts were left 
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out by appellant. First, the petitioner's land was the only 
good residential land left within which a rapidly grow. 
ing city could expand because of a river, railroad, and an 
industrial area on all other sides. Second, while the case 
involved two cities sharing a common boundary, the peti. 
tioner made no claim that he would join the City of 
Sioux Falls if the court severed him from South Sioux 
Falls. Thus, the court was faced with a situation of an 
"island" of county land in the middle of two cities should 
it grant the disconnection. 
Finally, In 1·e Alteration uf Lines, Etc., 95 A.2d 
506 (Pa. 1953) is totally irrelevant. This case concerned 
an attempt to achieve a severance and annexation ofter· 
ritory under a statute designed to settle boundary dis· 
putes. The court merely held that this statute was in· 
applicable to severance and thus could not affect it. 
Appellant's reliance upon cases where disconnection 
would have created unregulated, untaxed and unpro· 
tected "islands," is completely misplaced. In this case the 
trial court was most careful to insure that its deannexa· 
tion order would not create such an "island" out of the 
subject territory. The order of disconnection was M 
pressly conditioned npon the petitioner making applica· 
tion for annexation of the property by the Town of East 
Layton (R. 43 and T. 212). That application was made 
and was approved, and the subject territory has now 
been formaJly annexed to the Town of East Layton (R 
M5-47). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Utah courts liave always decided deannexation 
ca~es by balancing all the facts and circumstances on a 
case-by-case basis to determine if justice and equity 
would best be served by granting or denying the sever-
ance request. Since the trial court's decision must be 
based primarily upon facts presented at the hearing, its 
findings and conclusions should he given considerable 
deference by this court, and its decision should not be 
reversed unless clearly and patently erroneous. In this 
case a trial judge of considerable experience in discon-
nection cases carefully weigh~d all of the evidence and 
came to the conclusion that the petitioner had established 
the allegations of his petition and that justice and equity 
required that disconnection be granted. It is respectfully 
submitted that the decision of the trial court was not 
clearly and patently erroneous and should, therefore, be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD ,V. GIAUQUE 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall 
& McCarthy 
Suite 300, 141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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